

Summa Theologica III q62. The sacraments' principal effect, which is grace

- 1. Are the sacraments of the New Law the cause of grace?**
- 2. Does sacramental grace confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts?**
- 3. Do the sacraments contain grace?**
- 4. Is there any power in them for the causing of grace?**
- 5. Do the sacraments derive this power from Christ's Passion?**
- 6. Did the sacraments of the Old Law cause grace?**

[From the *Summa Theologica* of Saint Thomas Aquinas as translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, and from the works of Blessed John Duns Scotus as selected and arranged by Jerome of Montefortino and as translated by Peter L.P. Simpson. Texts are taken from the *Opus Oxoniense* and the *Reportata Parisiensia* of the Wadding edition of Scotus' works.]

Article 1. Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments are not the cause of grace. For it seems that the same thing is not both sign and cause: since the nature of sign appears to be more in keeping with an effect. But a sacrament is a sign of grace. Therefore it is not its cause.

Objection 2. Further, nothing corporeal can act on a spiritual thing: since "the agent is more excellent than the patient," as Augustine says (*Gen. ad lit. xii*). But the subject of grace is the human mind, which is something spiritual. Therefore the sacraments cannot cause grace.

Objection 3. Further, what is proper to God should not be ascribed to a creature. But it is proper to God to cause grace, according to *Ps. 83:12*: "The Lord will give grace and glory." Since, therefore, the sacraments consist in certain words and created things, it seems that they cannot cause grace.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx in Joan.*) that the baptismal water

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.4; Report. ib. q.3]

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments are causes of the grace conferred by them. For the saints expressly attribute to the sacraments causality with respect to grace; therefore the sacraments causally attain grace. For [*Oxon. 4 d.1 q.4 n.1 arg.1*] Augustine says (*Homil 80 in Ioannem*), "What is that virtue of water such that it touch the body and wash the heart?" But the heart, that is the soul, is not washed except by grace or the cause of grace. – Again it is commonly said that *the sacraments of the new law effect what they are figures of*: but they are figures or signs of grace; therefore causality with respect to grace is to be attributed to the sacraments; but they cannot have causality as necessary conditions, for that sort of causality, which does not attain the effect nor posits, by bringing about, a disposition for it, is not a causality except accidentally; so since the sacraments are not causes of grace accidentally, for then causality would not be put in their definition, they must therefore be causes of grace essentially.

"touches the body and cleanses the heart." But the heart is not cleansed save through grace. Therefore it causes grace: and for like reason so do the other sacraments of the Church.

I answer that, We must needs say that in some way the sacraments of the New Law cause grace. For it is evident that through the sacraments of the New Law man is incorporated with Christ: thus the Apostle says of Baptism (*Galatians 3:27*): "As many of you as have been baptized in Christ have put on Christ." And man is made a member of Christ through grace alone.

Some, however, say that they are the cause of grace not by their own operation, but in so far as God causes grace in the soul when the sacraments are employed. And they give as an example a man who on presenting a leaden coin, receives, by the king's command, a hundred pounds: not as though the leaden coin, by any operation of its own, caused him to be given that sum of money; this being the effect of the mere will of the king. Hence Bernard says in a sermon on the Lord's Supper: "Just as a canon is invested by means of a book, an abbot by means of a crozier, a bishop by means of a ring, so by the various sacraments various kinds of grace are conferred." But if we examine the question properly, we shall see that according to the above mode the sacraments are mere signs. For the leaden coin is nothing but a sign of the king's command that this man should receive money. In like manner the book is a sign of the conferring of a canonry. Hence, according to this opinion the sacraments of the New Law would be mere signs of grace; whereas we have it on the authority of many saints that the sacraments of the New Law not only signify, but also cause grace.

Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. n.1*] According to the Master of the *Sentences* [4 d.1 ch.3], the sacraments of the Old and New Law are distinguished by this, that the former were only signs of grace, but the latter, that is those of the New Law, are not only signs of grace but also causes of it; therefore they have a true causality with respect to grace; for the way they effect grace is the way they are truly distinguished from the sacraments of the Old Law.

Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib. q.5 n.2*] When it is said that the sacraments are causes of grace, that is not to be taken as if water, for example, attains grace in baptism by its form and virtue, because grace is created by God alone. Nor again is grace caused by water in so far as it is an instrument of divine mercy, but water acts, as such an instrument, only on the advance disposition on which grace necessarily follows; but that which causes a disposition on which a form necessarily follows is said to cause the form; therefore the sacraments are truly said to cause grace, not principally nor even instrumentally (I mean through the virtue of the principal agent), but only dispositively, in so far, that is to say, as they attain an advance disposition for grace – which disposition in certain sacraments is a character, while in others it is a certain ornament of the soul proportioned to the character.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib. q.4 n.1*] Bernard (*Sermon De Coena Domini*) says, "Just as the investiture of a canon is done by means of a book, of an abbot by means of a rod, of a Bishop by means of a ring, so the diverse divisions of the graces are handed on by the sacraments;" but the book is not an efficient cause of being a prebendary, nor a ring of episcopacy; therefore neither of them is a sacrament or efficient cause of grace. – Again, if

We must therefore say otherwise, that an efficient cause is twofold, principal and instrumental. The principal cause works by the power of its form, to which form the effect is likened; just as fire by its own heat makes something hot. In this way none but God can cause grace: since grace is nothing else than a participated likeness of the Divine Nature, according to *2 Pt. 1:4*: "He hath given us most great and precious promises; that we may be [*Vulg.*: 'you may be made'] partakers of the Divine Nature." But the instrumental cause works not by the power of its form, but only by the motion whereby it is moved by the principal agent: so that the effect is not likened to the instrument but to the principal agent: for instance, the couch is not like the axe, but like the art which is in the craftsman's mind. And it is thus that the sacraments of the New Law cause grace: for they are instituted by God to be employed for the purpose of conferring grace. Hence Augustine says (*Contra Faust. xix*): "All these things," viz. pertaining to the sacraments, "are done and pass away, but the power," viz. of God, "which works by them, remains ever." Now that is, properly speaking, an instrument by which someone works: wherefore it is written (*Titus 3:5*): "He saved us by the laver of regeneration."

Reply to Objection 1. The principal cause cannot properly be called a sign of its effect, even though the latter be hidden and the cause itself sensible and manifest. But an instrumental cause, if manifest, can be called a sign of a hidden effect, for this reason, that it is not merely a cause but also in a measure an effect in so far as it is moved by the principal agent. And in this sense the sacraments of the New Law are both cause and signs. Hence, too, is it that, to use the common expression, "they effect what they signify." From this it is clear that

sacraments effected grace or an advance disposition to grace, they would either be equivocal or univocal causes; but not univocal causes as is clear, because the effect is invisible; neither equivocal causes, because those sensible things are not more perfect than grace nor than the advance dispositions to grace.

I answer that, [*Oxon. ib. q.5 n.4*] no proper action and causality is to be attributed to the sacraments with respect to grace, nor with respect to a supernatural advance disposition to grace.

And a first proof is this: the sacraments, as some think, have a physical causality with respect to grace because they have it with respect to the advance disposition for grace; but, as was said in *Ia q.45 a.1*, a creature cannot act, even instrumentally, to complete the creation of something, which fact should be much more true of a bodily and material substance such as the sacraments are; but an advance disposition for grace, whether it be a character or a supernatural ornament of the soul, is the term of some creating; therefore since a creature cannot act to bring this about, neither might it be attained through its action by the sacraments. *Proof of the minor:* for the advance disposition is a simply supernatural form, and that any such form is something that cannot be educed from the natural potency of the receiving subject is just as true as that the subject too is in obediential potency to a form of that sort; therefore it is precisely through creation that the form is attainable, inasmuch as it is something simply supernatural, that is to say, something to which there is in the subject no natural inclination but only, as they suppose, an obediential potency.

The next proof is: [*Oxon. ib. n.4*] an

they perfectly fulfil the conditions of a sacrament; being ordained to something sacred, not only as a sign, but also as a cause.

Reply to Objection 2. An instrument has a twofold action; one is instrumental, in respect of which it works not by its own power but by the power of the principal agent: the other is its proper action, which belongs to it in respect of its proper form: thus it belongs to an axe to cut asunder by reason of its sharpness, but to make a couch, in so far as it is the instrument of an art. But it does not accomplish the instrumental action save by exercising its proper action: for it is by cutting that it makes a couch. In like manner the corporeal sacraments by their operation, which they exercise on the body that they touch, accomplish through the Divine institution an instrumental operation on the soul; for example, the water of baptism, in respect of its proper power, cleanses the body, and thereby, inasmuch as it is the instrument of the Divine power, cleanses the soul: since from soul and body one thing is made. And thus it is that Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. xii) that it "touches the body and cleanses the heart."

Reply to Objection 3. This argument considers that which causes grace as principal agent; for this belongs to God alone, as stated above.

advance disposition for grace, which the sacraments are posited as physically causing, is induced, or can be induced, in an instant; but the sacraments cannot have physical action in an instant; therefore an advance disposition is not physically caused by them. *Proof of the major:* first, because the necessitating disposition, when there is no impediment in the one receiving, comes about at the same time as the form; but grace comes about in an instant; therefore the disposition for it does too, when there is no impediment; second, because there is no succession in a form, except in the case of parts of a movable thing or in the case of parts of the form itself; but here the subject is indivisible, nor is any succession required in the disposition because, just as it is possible to induce a minimal grace, so for this grace a minimal disposition is sufficient, which would necessarily be induced in an instant. *Proof of the minor:* for a sacrament, since it essentially includes words spoken in succession, is a successive thing; therefore it cannot exist or act with a real, natural action except in time; therefore neither can it act with a supernatural action except in time, because, as they suppose, it does not belong to an instrument to have a supernatural action except when it has a natural and proper action and, consequently, since the disposition to grace would not be produced in an instant, the sacraments will not be physically productive of grace.

There is here the following sort of response: [Oxon. ib. n.5] one syllable of the whole sacramental prayer has being in an instant; therefore the sacraments themselves attain the disposition, which comes about in an instant. *On the contrary,* even a syllable is, with the local motion of the air, successively formed; therefore it is itself too pronounced in time. Further, is that syllable the first or the last or in the middle of the prayer? Whichever one you say, since it is the one that physically attains the disposition and the others do not, it follows that the disposition would follow on it by itself even were it formed in separation, because it is itself the precise cause, and the rest do not cause the disposition: but this is

plainly false, because the sacrament is not completed unless all the words in which the form of the sacraments consists are pronounced.

They reply that the last syllable is the completing instrument and achieves the above mentioned action, not through its own virtue, but by virtue of all the preceding syllables, just as the last drop of water wears away the stone in virtue all of the preceding drops. *On the contrary*, it is for this reason that the last drop of water wears away the stone in virtue of the preceding ones, because the preceding ones have left an advance disposition for that end: but here the preceding syllables leave no disposition before the last syllable.

Finally, in the sacrament of the Eucharist such real causality does not seem to be possible; therefore it should not be posited in the case of the others. *Declaration of the assumption*: for either the causality would be posited in respect of the Eucharist already consecrated, or in respect of the sacramental consecrating. But not in the first way, because the species of bread is not the instrumental cause with respect to the real existence of the body of Christ, nor with respect to another disposition for that effect. Nor in the second way, for the words pronounced do not attain the transubstantiation which is the principal end of this consecrating. But since the transubstantiation does not come about except by the infinite virtue of God, just as is also true of creation, if the sacraments do not physically attain the end of creation, neither will they be able to attain an advance disposition to transubstantiation; for that disposition would either be in the body of Christ, and then it would not be a disposition to that body; or it would be in the bread, and then, since it would be itself necessitating for transubstantiation, it would exist in the same instant with the transubstantiation, and consequently the bread, as being the subject of the disposition, would exist at the same time as the transubstantiation which is the necessary accompaniment of the disposition; and this is contradictory.

Reply to Objection 1. I concede that the sacraments are not accidental causes; but from this it does not follow that they ought to reach to the advance disposition to grace by a real and physical action, since their causality is nothing but a certain moral action, as will be explained in the following article. Therefore, just as those who attribute to the sacraments a real causality say that the character or the ornament in the soul is a per se disposition to grace, [*Oxon. ib.* q.5 n.17] so I say that the sacrament or its reception is a per se proximate disposition to grace, and for this reason it could rightly be defined by the saints and doctors with respect to this end or effect. For if someone were to consider the cutting of a vein as something ordered to health, certainly he would define that cutting and assign a difference to it from that order under which he is considering the cutting. So the saints and doctors, considering the sacraments insofar as the sacraments have from divine institution an order to grace, ignore their physical activities and define them and assign their differences under that order to grace.

Reply to Objection 2. I reply [*Oxon. ib.*] that the sacraments of the Old and New law are not distinguished by that which cannot possibly agree with them, such as is active and physical action for something spiritual in the soul. Therefore, the sacraments of the New Law are causes of grace as being an efficacious sign of grace; but the sacraments of the Old Law – I am speaking of sacraments in the improper sense, such as were the sacrifices

and offerings and ceremonies of that law – did not cause grace in this way; for sacraments in the proper sense were both signs of grace, as being efficacious signs of it, and also caused grace, although they did not have equal efficacy with the sacraments of the New Law, which received that efficacy from the presentation of the passion of Christ, as will be evident below in article 5.

Reply to Objection 3. The answer is evident from what was said in the solution.

Again Article 1. Whether the sacraments are the cause of grace?

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments cause the grace which they signify with a true causality. For [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.4 n.1] Augustine says (*Homil. 80 in Ioannem*), “What is that virtue of water such that it touch the body and wash the heart?” But he is speaking about baptismal water; therefore it washes the heart by touching the body; but the heart, the soul that is, is not washed except by grace; therefore the water causes grace.

Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib.*] The Master of the *Sentences*, when positing the idea of a sacrament (4 d.1 ch.2), says the sacrament is “a sign of grace such that it both bears its image and exists as its cause;” therefore he elegantly attributes to the sacraments causality with respect to grace.

Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.*] In a certain Prayer the Church requests: “May your sacraments, Lord, perfect in us what they contain.” From this two arguments follow: first, grace is here requested and what is impossible is not requested; therefore it is possible for the sacraments to effect grace. Second, because the sacraments are indicated to contain what is requested, namely grace; but they do not contain grace formally as is clear; therefore they contain it virtually and causally.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib.*] Bernard (*Sermon De Coena Domini*) says, “Just as the investiture of a canon is done by means of a book, of an abbott by means of a rod, of a Bishop by means of a ring, so the diverse divisions of the graces are handed on by the sacraments.” Therefore since those things about which he gives examples are only signs of those grades of dignity, so the sacraments are only signs and not physical causes of grace.

I answer that, [*Oxon.* 4 q.1, q.5 n.13] the sacraments do not cause grace nor an advance disposition to it by a true and real causality, but they are merely moral causes of grace insofar as on those who rightly use and receive them God confers the grace which they infallibly signify, not because they attain to it by their own intrinsic virtue, but only infallibly through the assistance of God causing that effect; not infallibly nor necessarily by an absolute necessity, but by a necessity respecting God’s ordained power, I mean with respect to the present dispositions freely posited by divine providence, by which he informs his Church and promises that he will give to those who rightly receive the sacraments the grace which they signify. Therefore the sacraments themselves, or the

reception of them, is the immediate disposition for grace, which although it be in the soul while that reception concerns and is performed about the body, nevertheless that reception itself of the sacraments is truly a disposition to grace; for although this disposition is not in the same subject in which the form is, nevertheless that both are in the same supposit is enough, especially since a disposition of this sort is not such from the nature of the thing but in its order to an agent that is voluntarily causing the form or its term. – *The proposition is further declared thus:* [*Oxon. ib. n.12*) the necessity of those things which relate to the end is not to be sought and received from anywhere else than from the end itself; therefore since the end of the sacraments is grace or some invisible effect ordered to salvation, and since the end itself can be sufficiently obtained without that which the sacraments are posited really to do either for the end itself or for an advance disposition to it, it follows that this sort of real action is not to be attributed to the sacraments themselves, because no plurality is to be posited without necessity.

How then will the sacraments not be accidental causes, if they themselves cause, by a true and real action, neither grace nor a disposition to grace? – I answer that, [*Oxon. ib. n.12*] the view laid down, that they themselves do not have that real action (which in fact cannot be nor should be attributed to them), can still very well cohere with the fact that the sacraments are per se causes and not accidental ones. *Which I prove:* every necessitating disposition to a form, but one which is not the nature of the receptive subject, can be called in a certain way an active cause, or an instrumental cause, with respect to the form; but the sacrament itself, or the receiving of the sacrament, is such a disposition and not an immediate cause of another medium between itself and grace; therefore it can be called in some way an active cause or an instrumental cause with respect to grace. *Proof of the minor:* because, in the opinion of those who attribute a real active power to the sacraments, it is for this reason that they say the sacraments cause grace, not because they attain to it, but because they act for a preparatory disposition for the grace which is immediately, without the concurrence of that preparatory disposition, created by God; therefore the sacraments will also be per se active causes, or instrumental causes, of grace, through the fact that they are posited as precisely not physical dispositions but moral ones, necessitating the infusion of grace, not from an intrinsic virtue of themselves, but by compact of divine assistance. *An example:* It is absolutely conceded that merit is an instrumental cause with respect to reward, so much so that the reward is acquired through the merit, and nevertheless the merit does not actively cause the reward in itself nor does it cause any intermediate disposition for it; but, since the merit itself is a disposition preparatory for, and not by way of being receptive of, grace, it is said to be a per se active cause of the reward. So the sacraments too will rightly be said to cause grace per se, although they may not physically attain to it or to an intermediate disposition for grace, because of the fact that they are moral dispositions, not holding their existence from the side of the receptive subject, which are necessitating for infusion of grace from the compact of divine assistance. Otherwise [*Oxon. 3 d.9; 4 d.1 qq.6, 7; d.2 q.1*] it does not seem plausible to attribute to the sacraments a greater and more efficacious causality with respect to grace than the passion itself of Christ had in itself; for the sacraments receive their efficacy from that passion, as will be clear below in article 5. But the passion of Christ has precisely a moral and not physical influence on grace; for it retains as presented the same sort of mode of causing grace as it had when it

was to be presented, and in this latter state it plainly did not effect the justification of men except meritoriously and morally.

Besides, [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.5 n.14] an instrument in artificial things does not formally have an active force: for a saw only has in itself quantity, figure, and local motion, which are not active forms; for otherwise the mathematician, when he is considering the how much of figures, would not abstract from motion. Nor does it seem that hardness is to be posited as an active quality, because if God were to conserve in being some soft mass in the same quantity and figure, it would, by moving itself locally, as equally divide some body as now a hard instrument divides it; therefore hardness is not formally the principle of acting. Therefore [*Oxon. ib.* n.15] just as an agent effectively induces heat, and just as the heat itself does not effectively but formally expel the cold, so an agent in motion by use of an instrument is formally expelled, through that instrument, from the same *where* that another body is, because of their impossibility. For the cutting of wood through a saw is only a certain expulsion of parts from the *where* to which the saw is moved by the artisan. Artificial instruments therefore are not formally active but only receptive of a certain prior effect that is ordered to an ultimate effect. Since therefore this is how things stand with an instrument, rightly is a sacrament called an instrument, although it does not have active virtue properly with respect to its term, since it is a certain prior effect ordered to the grace which it signifies, and which it even causes *per se*, and not accidentally, in the way already explained.

Reply to Objection 1. [*Oxon. ib.* n.17) I concede that the baptismal water washes the heart, that is the soul, not indeed by causing a disposition intermediate between itself and the grace that washes, but it washes as it were a disposition that is proximate and immediate to grace in the manner in which merit is said to induce beatitude or in which the cutting of a vein, or another preparation of the sort, induces health; for if a sacrament were to cause a disposition for grace by a real action, and if it were thus said to wash, there would be need that that disposition should wash, that is cause grace, more immediately; because what is cause of something prior is not on this account cause of something posterior unless the middle is cause of the third and is so, moreover, in the same order of causing; otherwise it would not be understood to be cause of the third as it is cause of the prior effect. Since therefore God alone, and not the advance disposition, is cause of grace, neither will the sacraments, by a real action, cause one or the other of them.

Reply to Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib.*] I say that the Master, by the addition that he made of “and exists as cause”, understands and wishes the sacrament to be an efficacious sign, by which is meant that it is a sign that is practical and certain and true and naturally previous to what it signifies.

Reply to Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.*] I say that if the motion of the saw were a proximate disposition to the inducing of some form, and was so, not because of the nature of some motion, but because of the disposition of some agent working along with it at the same time, reasonably could it be requested of that agent that he should want that motion to complete what it contains; that is to say, that just as the motion contains that as a

preparatory disposition, so it should complete it, that is, that that should follow immediately upon the motion. Thus it is in the proposition, as is established from what has been said.

Article 2. Whether sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts. For the grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the soul sufficiently, both in its essence and in its powers; as is clear from what was said in I-II, 110, 3,4. But grace is ordained to the perfecting of the soul. Therefore sacramental grace cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Objection 2. Further, the soul's defects are caused by sin. But all sins are sufficiently removed by the grace of the virtues and gifts: because there is no sin that is not contrary to some virtue. Since, therefore, sacramental grace is ordained to the removal of the soul's defects, it cannot confer anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Objection 3. Further, every addition or subtraction of form varies the species (*Metaph.* viii). If, therefore, sacramental grace confers anything in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it follows that it is called grace equivocally: and so we are none the wiser when it is said that the sacraments cause grace.

On the contrary, If sacramental grace confers nothing in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts, it is useless to confer the sacraments on those who have the

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.2 qq.1, 6]

Objection 1. It seems that sacramental grace adds nothing above the grace of the virtues and the gifts. For [*Oxon.* 3 d.34 n.14] the seven general virtues, namely the three theological and four moral virtues, perfect the wayfarer simply as regards every object, insofar as he can be perfected while on the way; therefore sacramental grace adds nothing above the aforementioned virtues, otherwise the wayfarer would not be sufficiently perfected by them.

Objection 2. Sacramental grace cannot effect in the soul anything other than to wipe away the dirt of sins within it and to bestow the right to inherit heavenly glory; but these very things are effected in the soul by habitual grace; therefore to someone who has this grace the sacraments confer no grace, because they would have no effect on the soul. *Proof of the minor:* grace and charity divide equally the children of the kingdom and the children of perdition, as Augustine says (*De Civ. Dei* 15 ch. 80); therefore [*Oxon.* 2 d.27] the grace of the sacraments can bestow nothing on a soul that has the habit of charity which that habit has not already given.

On the contrary, (*from the preceding question*) the sacraments are necessary for human salvation, and for every state, indeed, after the fall; but if they were to add nothing to the seven aforementioned

virtues and gifts. But there is nothing useless in God's works. Therefore it seems that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

I answer that, As stated in I-II, 110, 3,4, grace, considered in itself, perfects the essence of the soul, in so far as it is a certain participated likeness of the Divine Nature. And just as the soul's powers flow from its essence, so from grace there flow certain perfections into the powers of the soul, which are called virtues and gifts, whereby the powers are perfected in reference to their actions. Now the sacraments are ordained unto certain special effects which are necessary in the Christian life: thus Baptism is ordained unto a certain spiritual regeneration, by which man dies to vice and becomes a member of Christ: which effect is something special in addition to the actions of the soul's powers: and the same holds true of the other sacraments. Consequently just as the virtues and gifts confer, in addition to grace commonly so called, a certain special perfection ordained to the powers' proper actions, so does sacramental grace confer, over and above grace commonly so called, and in addition to the virtues and gifts, a certain Divine assistance in obtaining the end of the sacrament. It is thus that sacramental grace confers something in addition to the grace of the virtues and gifts.

Reply to Objection 1. The grace of the virtues and gifts perfects the essence and powers of the soul sufficiently as regards ordinary conduct: but as regards certain special effects which are necessary in a Christian life, sacramental grace is needed.

Reply to Objection 2. Vices and sins are sufficiently removed by virtues and gifts,

virtues, they would not seem to be necessary; further, along with these virtues can coexist a need for the sacraments, at any rate a need for the sacrament of orders and of matrimony; therefore etc.

I answer that, [*Oxon.* 4 d.2 q.1 n.3] sacramental grace is diverse from habitual grace and thence from the other virtues and gifts, if the gifts are posited as diverse from the virtues; and consequently sacramental grace adds something to them all. For sacramental grace, which is conferred by God on those who rightly receive the sacraments, is given for an end special to the sacraments; therefore it differs from habitual grace in the nature of its effect; for through baptism is conferred grace by way of spiritual regeneration; through confirmation is bestowed the grace of strength and constancy in professing the faith professed in baptism; through the eucharist the grace of preservation from mortal sins is given and of perseverance in good works; but extreme unction wipes away the remains of sins, and stirs up in the the sick confidence in divine mercy; the grace, however, conferred in orders is so that the sacraments of the Church might be appropriately administered; and in matrimony, finally, is conferred the grace whereby the duties of matrimony are supported and offspring are duly educated and the concupiscence of the flesh is overcome. All these things conferred by God through the medium of the sacraments are actual helps by which those who receive the sacraments can carry out and attain the proper ends of the same; therefore sacramental grace superadds to habitual grace, and to the other habits which perfect the wayfarer, that which is required, and which the sacraments demand, in those who receive them, and thus in the nature of what they effect.

as to present and future time. in so far as they prevent man from sinning. But in regard to past sins, the acts of which are transitory whereas their guilt remains, man is provided with a special remedy in the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 3. Sacramental grace is compared to grace commonly so called, as species to genus. Wherefore just as it is not equivocal to use the term "animal" in its generic sense, and as applied to a man, so neither is it equivocal to speak of grace commonly so called and of sacramental grace.

sacraments and through the grace conferred by them.

Reply to Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib. q.6*] A sacrament more properly signifies the effect in the soul, for which grace is conferred in the sacrament, than it signifies the grace itself. Hence, although grace exists as single in the soul, nevertheless diverse sacraments are distinguished according to the diverse properties they signify (as expounded in the solution), which things signified are, to be sure, diverse effects of the same grace. Therefore the grace which is conferred through the sacraments bestows that special effect which the sacrament per se signifies; and if it finds a soul washed from sins and heir to the kingdom, as sacraments do in the case of those who are alive, it increases, with respect to obtaining the effect which it properly signifies, the pre-existing grace.

Article 3. Whether the sacraments of the New Law contain grace?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace. For it seems that what is contained is in the container. But grace is not in the sacraments; neither as in a subject, because the subject of grace is not a body but a spirit; nor as in a vessel, for according to *Phys. iv*, "a vessel is a movable place," and an accident cannot be in a place. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace.

Reply to Objection 1. I say that indeed the wayfarer is perfect if he has all those habits of virtue, and as such he does not, taken as a particular person, need the sacraments, provided he does not despise them in the meanwhile. But because the human wayfarer can with much difficulty preserve those habits, sacramental grace is therefore at hand for him so as to achieve it; and hence sacramental grace, by this title, is not superfluous to him but especially necessary. Further, although the wayfarer may have all those virtues, nevertheless because he does not have them, except by a very special privilege of God, in the most perfect grade, they can be perpetually increased through the continual use of the

sacraments and through the grace conferred by them.

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.3]

Objection 1. The sacraments of the New Law do seem to contain grace. For [*Report. 4 d.1 q.3 n.1*] the Church seems expressly to signify this in one of its collects saying, "Let the sacraments, O Lord, perfect in us what they contain;" but that which, from the sacraments, is perfective of the soul which receives them is grace; therefore they contain this very thing, that is to say, grace.

Objection 2. Further, sacraments are instituted as means whereby men may obtain grace. But since grace is an accident it cannot pass from one subject to another. Therefore it would be of no account if grace were in the sacraments.

Objection 3. Further, a spiritual thing is not contained by a corporeal, even if it be therein; for the soul is not contained by the body; rather does it contain the body. Since, therefore, grace is something spiritual, it seems that it cannot be contained in a corporeal sacrament.

On the contrary, Hugh of S. Victor says (*De Sacram.* i) that "a sacrament, through its being sanctified, contains an invisible grace."

I answer that, A thing is said to be in another in various ways; in two of which grace is said to be in the sacraments. First, as in its sign; for a sacrament is a sign of grace. Secondly, as in its cause; for, as stated above (1) a sacrament of the New Law is an instrumental cause of grace. Wherefore grace is in a sacrament of the New Law, not as to its specific likeness, as an effect in its univocal cause; nor as to some proper and permanent form proportioned to such an effect, as effects in non-univocal causes, for instance, as things generated are in the sun; but as to a certain instrumental power transient and incomplete in its natural being, as will be explained later on (4).

Reply to Objection 1. Grace is said to be in a sacrament not as in its subject; nor as in a vessel considered as a place, but understood as the instrument of some work to be done, according to *Ezech.* 9:1: "Everyone hath a destroying vessel [Douay: 'weapon'] in his hand."

Objection 2. According to what was said above in article 1, the sacraments are rightly said to be causes of grace, and indeed per se and not accidentally; but in the way in which something is the cause of a second thing, in that way it is a container of it; therefore if the sacraments are per se causes of grace, the sacraments themselves per se contain grace.

Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.*, *Report.* 4 d.1 q.4 n.3] A sacrament is spiritual medicine for the soul itself, insofar as through the grace, which is conferred by them, the soul is healed and the wounds of sin are covered over and destroyed; but medicine contains in its order the health which it induces; therefore, by parity of reasoning, the sacraments of the New Law will also contain the grace whereby the soul is reinstated in spiritual health.

On the contrary, [*Report.* 4 d.1 q.3 n.2] Augustine says (83 *qq.*), "It belongs to God alone to illumine souls;" but souls are illumined by grace; therefore he alone causes grace in the soul; therefore grace is not contained in the sacraments but in the cause adequate to it.

I answer that, [*Report.* 4 d.1 q.3 n.2] the sacraments of the New Law do not contain grace as an effect is contained in a univocal cause, or in an equivocal one. And indeed, that the sacraments are not univocal causes of grace is manifest; because grace cannot be formally in the sacraments since they are sensible and material. Nor can it be in the sacraments as in an equivocal cause, because an equivocal cause is simply more perfect than that which it causes; but in sensible things there cannot be anything more noble or eminent than grace; therefore grace cannot be in the sacraments as in its real univocal or equivocal cause.

Reply to Objection 2. Although an accident does not pass from one subject to another, nevertheless in a fashion it does pass from its cause into its subject through the instrument; not so that it be in each of these in the same way, but in each according to its respective nature.

Reply to Objection 3. If a spiritual thing exist perfectly in something, it contains it and is not contained by it. But, in a sacrament, grace has a passing and incomplete mode of being: and consequently it is not unfitting to say that the sacraments contain grace.

However, since the sacraments are per se causes of grace and of the proximate disposition for grace, which grace God confers, in the way in which he himself has ordained and which was expounded in article 1, on those who receive them, and since the sacraments have an influence on grace as instrumental causes, then, just as an instrument in artificial things receives a prior effect ordered to the ultimate effect, so the sacraments themselves seem to contain grace in the way effects are said to be contained in their moral cause, and in the way effects are contained in their advance dispositions which necessitate the physical cause voluntarily determined to produce them.

Reply to Objections. The response is evident from what was said in the solution; for it was declared [*Report. ib.*] how the sacraments are and can be said to be a cause of grace – not a physical cause, to be sure, whether univocal or equivocal, but a moral cause at any rate; and just as a necessitating disposition to form, which is not the nature of the receiving subject, is in a certain way an active instrumental cause of that form, for which reason merit is said to be a cause of reward, so also the taking up of the sacraments is a disposition with respect to grace, being a necessitation for grace from the compact of God, he having himself instituted signs of his infallible assistance, unless, on the receiver's own part, an indisposition gets in the way

Article 4. Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that there is not in the sacraments a power of causing grace. For the power of causing grace is a spiritual power. But a spiritual power cannot be in a body; neither as proper to it, because power flows from a thing's essence and consequently cannot transcend it; nor as derived from something else, because that which is received into anything follows the mode of the recipient. Therefore in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Scotus [*Oxon. 4 d.1 q.5; Report. ib. q.4*]

Objection 1. It seems that in the sacraments there is a virtue causative of grace, for virtue always names a principle of acting, which is some absolute form; but the sacraments [*Oxon. 4 d.5 q.5 n.3*] are not the principal agents but the instruments of grace; because, therefore, the virtue of acting is proportionate to the agent itself, there cannot be that virtue in the sacraments such as there is in the principal agent; but in this principal agent that absolute form exists according to the

Objection 2. Further, whatever exists is reducible to some kind of being and some degree of good. But there is no assignable kind of being to which such a power can belong; as anyone may see by running through them all. Nor is it reducible to some degree of good; for neither is it one of the goods of least account, since sacraments are necessary for salvation: nor is it an intermediate good, such as are the powers of the soul, which are natural powers; nor is it one of the greater goods, for it is neither grace nor a virtue of the mind. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power of causing grace.

Objection 3. Further, if there be such a power in the sacraments, its presence there must be due to nothing less than a creative act of God. But it seems unbecoming that so excellent a being created by God should cease to exist as soon as the sacrament is complete. Therefore it seems that in the sacraments there is no power for causing grace.

Objection 4. Further, the same thing cannot be in several. But several things concur in the completion of a sacrament, namely, words and things: while in one sacrament there can be but one power. Therefore it seems that there is no power of causing grace in the sacraments.

On the contrary, Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx in Joan.*): "Whence hath water so great power, that it touches the body and cleanses the heart?" And Bede says that "Our Lord conferred a power of regeneration on the waters by the contact of His most pure body."

I answer that, Those who hold that the sacraments do not cause grace save by a certain coincidence, deny the sacraments

completeness of its being; therefore such a form cannot exist in the instrument. Since, therefore, an instrument acts insofar as it is moved by another, there must be in itself, as proportioned to its motion, a virtue of acting; and since motion is an incomplete entity, likewise that virtue of the sacraments too will have an incomplete and not perfect being; but these sorts of imperfect entities, which exist in a state of becoming, are commonly accustomed to be called intentions; therefore the supernatural virtue which is in the sacraments insofar as they are instruments of grace is in them as in a state of becoming and as an incomplete or intentional entity.

And if it be said to this argument [*Oxon. ib. n.3*] that it does not seem probable that supernatural virtue can be found in a body as in a subject, since this virtue is without extension and quantity, it is argued to the contrary that this response, namely that no supernatural virtue can be found in a body as in a subject, proceeds and is true of virtue that has complete being, but is not true of that virtue which is present according to incomplete being in the mode of intention. This can be made clear also by examples: first indeed because audible speaking, when it exists as a cause of learning, contains in a way, according to the Philosopher at the beginning of *De Sensu et Sensato*, the intentions of the soul whose conceptions are expressed through the speaking. Second, the virtue of the art is in the instrument when moved by the artisan, therefore the supernatural virtue is also in the sacraments as they are instruments of grace. Third, finally, because in the movement of a celestial body there in a way exists, according to the philosophers, the virtue of the separate substance that is moving it.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. 4 d.1 q.5 n.1*]

any power that is itself productive of the sacramental effect, and hold that the Divine power assists the sacraments and produces their effect. But if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the sacramental effects. Now such power is proportionate to the instrument: and consequently it stands in comparison to the complete and perfect power of anything, as the instrument to the principal agent. For an instrument, as stated above (1), does not work save as moved by the principal agent, which works of itself. And therefore the power of the principal agent exists in nature completely and perfectly: whereas the instrumental power has a being that passes from one thing into another, and is incomplete; just as motion is an imperfect act passing from agent to patient.

Reply to Objection 1. A spiritual power cannot be in a corporeal subject, after the manner of a permanent and complete power, as the argument proves. But there is nothing to hinder an instrumental spiritual power from being in a body; in so far as a body can be moved by a particular spiritual substance so as to produce a particular spiritual effect; thus in the very voice which is perceived by the senses there is a certain spiritual power, inasmuch as it proceeds from a mental concept, of arousing the mind of the hearer. It is in this way that a spiritual power is in the sacraments, inasmuch as they are ordained by God unto the production of a spiritual effect.

Reply to Objection 2. Just as motion, through being an imperfect act, is not properly in a genus, but is reducible to a genus of perfect act, for instance, alteration to the genus of quality: so, instrumental power, properly speaking, is not in any

every real supernatural accident is simply more perfect than any natural accident. *Proof:* for a natural cause has no power over the former, but the former has power over the latter; but this lack of power could not, it seems, arise from anywhere else than from the effect's eminence; therefore if there was some supernatural virtue in the sacraments it would be simply nobler than every natural quality; therefore in the sacramental words of any sacrament there would be found some absolute accident simply more perfect than every perfection of an intellectual creature, which is unacceptable.

I answer that, no virtue causative of grace is to be posited in the sacraments. *I prove this in a first way:* for [*Oxon. ib. n.8*] that supernatural virtue which is posited in the sacraments is either there indivisibly, that is to say, as whole in the whole and as whole in each part of the whole, or it is there as whole in the whole and as part in any of the parts. But it cannot be there in the first way, because that way is attributed, among all the forms that perfect matter, to the intellective soul alone; nor can it be posited there in the second way, because then it would have accidental extension in the subject, which is against the idea of spiritual virtue.

A second proof: The forms of the sacraments are commonly put together from several words; therefore, that same virtue would be altogether in any syllable whatever, or there would be one virtue in one syllable and another virtue in another. Suppose the first is said: then it must be confessed that the same accident migrates from subject to subject and remains after it has left a subject; for when the first syllable is going away, the virtue with which it was informed would survive and would inform the following syllable and so on up to the

genus, but is reducible to a genus and species of perfect act.

Reply to Objection 3. Just as an instrumental power accrues to an instrument through its being moved by the principal agent, so does a sacrament receive spiritual power from Christ's blessing and from the action of the minister in applying it to a sacramental use. Hence Augustine says in a sermon on the Epiphany (St. Maximus of Turin, *Serm.* xii): "Nor should you marvel, if we say that water, a corporeal substance, achieves the cleansing of the soul. It does indeed, and penetrates every secret hiding-place of the conscience. For subtle and clear as it is, the blessing of Christ makes it yet more subtle, so that it permeates into the very principles of life and searches the inner-most recesses of the heart."

Reply to Objection 4. Just as the one same power of the principal agent is instrumentally in all the instruments that are ordained unto the production of an effect, forasmuch as they are one as being so ordained: so also the one same sacramental power is in both words and things, forasmuch as words and things combine to form one sacrament.

require that that sort of supernatural virtue exist in water or in words; because without it a sacrament can be declared to be an efficacious sign of grace, and the effect can be obtained without its being attained by any physical form intrinsic to the sacraments. And since it is not possible to assign when that supernatural virtue would be produced in the sensible things belonging to the sacrament -- because it cannot be assigned before they are in use, nor can it be assigned in their very being applied, since no instrument is formally fitted for use on account of the fact that someone is actually using it but it is such before it is used -- it follows that the aforementioned supernatural virtue is not to be attributed to the sacraments.

Reply to the objection: To the argument which has persuaded some to think that an intrinsic virtue causative of grace is to be posited in the sacraments a response is evident from what was said in article 1: for it has been declared [*Oxon. ib.* n.12ff) that the

last. Suppose the second is held: then one sacrament put together from one act of speaking as its form would not have any virtue that was single, which is unacceptable; because just as a sacrament is constituted through the virtue which it has of causing its effect, because it is a practical sign, so it ought to have one simple nature of causing, just as its effect is simple. *And if* it be said that the virtue is one by the aggregation of the many virtues corresponding to the individual parts, *on the contrary*, [*Oxon. ib.* n.5] that virtue is not active which can never have its effect: but a virtue which would be in each and all parts of a form never has its effect nor can have it, for it would cease to be before the last particle of the speaking was completed; but until the last particle of the form is completed the effect signified would not be obtained; therefore in vain is virtue posited in the preceding particles, since neither could it have, when it is being produced, any real influence on the effect, nor could it leave behind any real disposition by whose ultimate virtue it might have causal power.

Finally, [*Oxon. ib.* n.7, and the last question] several things are not to be posited unless natural reason, or the truth of faith, demands it: but no natural reason proves that that virtue is to be posited in the sacraments; nor does the truth of faith

sacraments are instruments and per se causes of grace, even though they do not have, by a virtue existing within themselves, any influence either on grace itself or on the advance disposition for grace.

As for the examples, by which they think to make the proposition clear, I respond one by one as follows: *the first example*, about a perceptible act of speaking, manifestly assumes something false; for [*Oxon. ib.* n.10] audible speaking does not have formally in itself any intention of the soul. I prove this because a speaking that is not imposed for signifying something has in itself no such form, as is evident; but it does not receive by imposition any form absolute in itself, nor any relation, except perhaps a relation of reason. *In addition*, when the same principal agent exists and its instrument is sufficient, the same action follows; but if a Latin speaker were to speak Latin words to a Greek, there is the same principal agent and the same instrument as if he was speaking to another Latin speaker, but the effect does not follow because no concept is caused in the listening Greek; therefore that speaking was not of itself the instrument for causing a concept of the soul in the listener. The speaking therefore is something that is recollective with respect to the concept, such that when a change in the senses has been brought about by the speaking itself, and the nature further of the speaking has been understood, insofar as there is such a nature, the intellect, recognizing that the speaking has been imposed to signify such a nature, and by taking it together with that other thing, understands that which is signified by the name – not as if the speaking causes through some form a conception about anything; but speaking is the way leading to the concept of the thing, which concept is caused by the proper species of the thing or by a phantasm in the soul. This is established by the fact that whenever a speech is spoken, if the listener does not have within himself the species of the thing which is expressed by the name, no concept of it would be caused in him. Hence we do not understand things through vocal sounds unless we have the species of those things; but that we actually consider those things comes through taking together the sign with the thing signified.

The second example, [*Oxon. ib.*] about the tool of the artisan, does not conclude; for it seems altogether impossible that some form be caused in the saw as often as it is moved by the artisan, and that the form ceases to exist as often as it ceases to be actually moved; and I am not speaking of the impulse which the saw receives from the motive virtue of the artisan, but of the virtue which would be derived from his art and which would be the principle of acting for the instrument that the saw is, and which would be present in him antecedently to, or concomitantly with, the motion and the impulse.

Finally the third example, [*Oxon. ib.*; d.49 q.13 n.8] about motion, is not compelling, because, in whatever way the substances are caused by the heaven, the heaven's local motion at any rate cannot be the formal principle of producing them, because all this does is apply active things to passive things.

Again Article 4. Whether there be in the sacraments a power of causing grace?

Objection 1. It seems that there is in the sacraments some virtue causative of grace. For [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.4 n.1; q.5 n.1] Augustine says (*Homil. 80 in Ioannem*), “so great is the virtue of water that it touches the body and washes the heart.” Therefore there is in the water of baptism some virtue with respect to the infusion of grace, whereby the heart is washed; but it does not wash the soul except by causing and inducing grace; therefore there is in the sacraments some virtue causative of grace.

Objection 2. [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.5 n.1] A sacrament is spiritual medicine for the soul itself; but there is in medicine some virtue for healing; otherwise it would no more be a medicine than it would be anything else that was not a medicine, nor would it be applicable for the effect of inducing health; therefore there should be in the sacraments as well some virtue causative of grace whereby the soul is spiritually healed.

Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.*] A new relation cannot come new to something without some absolute that is new, as is said in the *Physics* (bk. 5 text. com.10), but water and words, insofar as they are parts of the sacrament of baptism, have the relation of sensible sign with respect to invisible grace; therefore they have some new absolute to be the foundation of that relation; that new absolute will be the virtue causative of grace; therefore some virtue must altogether be posited in the sacraments whereby grace is caused.

On the contrary, [*Oxon. ib.* n.1] sometimes diverse sensible things come together in the same sacrament; but the same absolute real accident cannot exist in diverse subjects; therefore there cannot be some one virtue which is the absolute real form in such a sacrament; for of one sacrament there is one virtue which should exist in its diverse foundations. -- *Again*, what quality would that virtue be? For it is not a habit or disposition, nor is it a natural power or lack of power, nor is it a passion or a passible quality, nor finally is it a form or figure; therefore no such virtue is to be posited in the sacraments.

I answer that, it must be said that no absolute virtue is to be posited in the sacraments, indeed this does not even have the possibility of being proved. For [*Report.* 4 d.1 q.4 n.11] a sacrament is a certain sensible sign ordained and instituted by God, efficaciously representing what it signifies, so that whoever properly receives that sign becomes a friend of God through the grace given him in receiving it, to such an extent that, insofar as it depends on the part of God assisting, the grace which it signifies should, unless his own indisposition on the part of the one receiving it gets in the way, infallibly be given. -- But if [*Report. ib.*; *Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.5 n.16], on account of the authorities of the saints and of the Church saying that the sacraments include virtue, you should contend that this virtue must altogether be posited and laid down as fact, it can be said that virtue is in one way the ultimate of power (*De Caelo* bk.1 comm.116). But the ultimate of power in the case of a practical sign is that it should signify efficaciously, that is, in advance and with certitude. For no greater power can belong to a sign insofar as it is something practical; so this virtue I concede exists in the sacraments; but I say that it is not an absolute form

but is only the relation of conformity of the sign to the thing signified, whether that conformity is posited as belonging to the essence of the sacrament or whether it is posited as not so belonging but is only an accident accompanying it for the most part; that idea is nevertheless the ultimate of power in the case of a practical sign, and so it is the virtue of the sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1. I say [*Oxon. ib. n.19*] that the virtue about which Augustine speaks is not anything other than the efficacy of a sign with respect to the thing signified, and that hence it is not any real absolute form, but only the truth of the sign as virtually preceding the thing signified.

Reply to Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib.*] If health could not be induced except by a voluntary agent, and if some sign was instituted by him that was efficacious or was a disposition necessitating him to induce health, then certainly that sign would be a medicine possessing virtue; not indeed through any absolute form which might be the principle of healing, but only through an efficacious ordering for health.

Reply to Objection 3. [*Oxon. ib.*] It can be said in one way that, as often as there is a new sacrament, there is a new foundation; and then indeed there is present a new relation without change of foundation, but that change is not towards anything absolute in the foundation but to the being of the foundation. -- Or it can be said [*Oxon. ib.*] that a relation of reason can be new in something without any newness of what is absolute in it; for, as regards a respect of this sort, it is enough that that absolute be compared anew to another through the act of the intellect. By that fact *a lord* can be newly so called without there being any new absolute in him. Or more to the point: a piece of money can be newly declared to be a thing's price, and this does not say anything but a respect of reason, just as having been exchanged for another thing does not either. For *being exchanged* does not more assert a real relation than being given does; for *being given*, since it says the relation of an object to the will, does not assert anything except a relation of reason in the thing given, just as being understood does not assert anything except a relation of reason in the object of understanding.

Article 5. Whether the sacraments of the New Law derive their power from Christ's Passion?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the New Law do not derive their power from Christ's Passion. For the power of the sacraments is in the causing of grace which is the principle of spiritual life in the soul. But as Augustine says (*Tract. xix in Joan.*): "The Word, as He was in the beginning

Scotus [*Oxon. 4 d.1 qq.1, 3; d.19; Report. ib.*]

Objection 1. The sacraments of the New Law do not seem to have the virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ. For "the cause in act and the effect in act are and are not at the same time" (*Metaphysics*, bk.2 text. com. 2 and 5). But the passion of

with God, quickens souls; as He was made flesh, quickens bodies." Since, therefore, Christ's Passion pertains to the Word as made flesh, it seems that it cannot cause the power of the sacraments.

Objection 2. Further, the power of the sacraments seems to depend on faith. for as Augustine says (*Tract. lxxx in Joan.*), the Divine Word perfects the sacrament "not because it is spoken, but because it is believed." But our faith regards not only Christ's Passion, but also the other mysteries of His humanity, and in a yet higher measure, His Godhead. Therefore it seems that the power of the sacraments is not due specially to Christ's Passion.

Objection 3. Further, the sacraments are ordained unto man's justification, according to *1 Cor.* 6:11: "You are washed . . . you are justified." Now justification is ascribed to the Resurrection, according to *Rm.* 4:25: "(Who) rose again for our justification." Therefore it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Resurrection rather than from His Passion.

On the contrary, on *Rm.* 5:14: "After the similitude of the transgression of Adam," etc., the gloss says: "From the side of Christ asleep on the Cross flowed the sacraments which brought salvation to the Church." Consequently, it seems that the sacraments derive their power from Christ's Passion.

I answer that, As stated above (1) a sacrament in causing grace works after the manner of an instrument. Now an instrument is twofold. the one, separate, as a stick, for instance; the other, united, as a hand. Moreover, the separate instrument is moved by means of the united instrument, as a stick by the hand. Now the principal efficient cause of grace is God Himself, in

Christ is not existing in act; therefore neither is any effect of it existing in act either; therefore if the sacraments have efficacy, it must be that they draw it from elsewhere than from the passion of Christ.

Objection 2. If the sacraments had their virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ, then they would have it from that passion either as foreseen to exist some time in the future or from it as already presented. If in the first way then the sacraments of the Old Law could have had efficacy through the same thing; but according to the Master of the *Sentences* (4 d.1 litt. E), the old sacraments only promised grace; therefore, they were not efficacious as they would certainly have been if they had borrowed grace from the passion of Christ as foreseen. But if the passion of Christ as presented gives efficacy, then Baptism and the Eucharist did not have efficacy from the passion of Christ since they were instituted before it was made manifest.

Objection 3. If the sacraments took their efficacy from the passion of Christ, they took it from that passion either as from a principal cause or as from a meritorious cause. But the first cannot be said; because that cannot be the principal cause of a sacrament which cannot be the principal cause of the effect signified by the sacrament; but of that effect God alone is cause by creating grace. Nor can the second be sustained: because with respect to grace there is no meritorious cause: "For if it is from merit then it is not from grace" (*Romans* 9).

Objection 4. If the sacraments had their efficacy from some passion, this would be above all from the wound in the Savior's side, according to the words of Augustine (*De Civit. Dei* bk.15 ch.26), when,

comparison with Whom Christ's humanity is as a united instrument, whereas the sacrament is as a separate instrument. Consequently, the saving power must needs be derived by the sacraments from Christ's Godhead through His humanity.

Now sacramental grace seems to be ordained principally to two things: namely, to take away the defects consequent on past sins, in so far as they are transitory in act, but endure in guilt; and, further, to perfect the soul in things pertaining to Divine Worship in regard to the Christian Religion. But it is manifest from what has been stated above (48, 1,2,6; 49, 1,3) that Christ delivered us from our sins principally through His Passion, not only by way of efficiency and merit, but also by way of satisfaction. Likewise by His Passion He inaugurated the Rites of the Christian Religion by offering "Himself--an oblation and a sacrifice to God" (*Ephesians* 5:2). Wherefore it is manifest that the sacraments of the Church derive their power specially from Christ's Passion, the virtue of which is in a manner united to us by our receiving the sacraments. It was in sign of this that from the side of Christ hanging on the Cross there flowed water and blood, the former of which belongs to Baptism, the latter to the Eucharist, which are the principal sacraments.

Reply to Objection 1. The Word, forasmuch as He was in the beginning with God, quickens souls as principal agent; but His flesh, and the mysteries accomplished therein, are as instrumental causes in the process of giving life to the soul: while in giving life to the body they act not only as instrumental causes, but also to a certain extent as exemplars, as we stated above (56, 1, ad 3).

Reply to Objection 2. Christ dwells in us

speaking of Noah's Ark, he says "the door in the side of the ark was certainly the wound when the side of the Crucified one was perforated by the lance. By this wound, indeed, those who come to him enter in, because from thence flowed the sacraments by which believers are initiated." But from that wound no sacrament can have its efficacy, because the wound was inflicted on the body when it was already dead, as is clear from *John* 19, "But when they had come to Jesus and saw that he was already dead, etc." But the body of Christ after his death was not the meritorious cause of any grace.

On the contrary, Augustine in the authority just cited and in *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia* (bk.2 ch.27) discourses in a long talk about the grace created through Christ and his passion.

I answer that, the sacraments have their virtue and efficacy from the passion of Christ. Because for a sacrament to have efficacy is for it to have the effect signified accompanying it as a regular matter; therefore it has its effect from that which makes it to be the case that its effect regularly accompanies it. And since that can happen and come about in two ways (namely either as from a principal cause that principally causes the accompanying of the effect, or as from a meritorious cause which, that is to say, merits there to be such an accompanying), the sacraments of the New Law have their efficacy from God alone as from the principal cause, but they have from Christ as suffering or from the passion of Christ their efficacy as from a meritorious cause. – *Proof of the first:* because God alone instituted the sacraments: but the efficacy of a sacrament cannot be from any cause inferior to that which instituted it; therefore the sacraments get their principal efficacy from God alone

"by faith" (*Ephesians* 3:17). Consequently, by faith Christ's power is united to us. Now the power of blotting out sin belongs in a special way to His Passion. And therefore men are delivered from sin especially by faith in His Passion, according to *Rm.* 3:25: "Whom God hath proposed to be a propitiation through faith in His Blood." Therefore the power of the sacraments which is ordained unto the remission of sins is derived principally from faith in Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 3. Justification is ascribed to the Resurrection by reason of the term "whither," which is newness of life through grace. But it is ascribed to the Passion by reason of the term "whence," i.e. in regard to the forgiveness of sin.

pleasing. But Christ was to the Trinity the most pleasing and the most accepted by far, as being he to whom God gave grace and not according to the measure of the other saints; therefore by offering himself in death for the satisfaction of human prevarication, and to the end that the elect might attain the glory for which they were preordained, he merited, in view of such a most accepted obedience, that God should pour out the grace by which sins are forgiven, by which we become friends of God, and by which we obtain eternal life. Therefore it was Christ, or his obedience presented to God in his passion, that was the most adequate meritorious cause meriting glory and grace for the elect; and so much so that nothing of spiritual charisms and gifts should descend upon the sons of Adam except in view of the merits of Christ who merited them all for everybody. And to no one would God ever have given any grace after the prevarication of the first man, and no more would he have received anyone into his grace and friendship, unless he had first accepted the obedience of Christ by whom we are reconciled to God. For that obedience was more accepted and dear to him than the prevarication of Adam was hateful and displeasing (as was said in questions 48 and 49 and frequently elsewhere).

Reply to Objection 1. I concede that the passion of Christ does not now exist in fact; but it does, however, exist in the divine acceptance, which is enough for it to be the meritorious cause of every grace which is conferred by God on those who worthily receive the sacraments. This often happens in fact also in human matters; for men frequently confer many things because of the merits, not of him to whom return is made, but of another, when these merits are not present in themselves but in memory (if they are already in the past) or in opinion (if they are trusted to be in the future).

as institutor. – *Again*, only God determines himself to causing an effect that is proper to himself; for if he were to be determined to acting by another, he would be, with respect to the determiner, the second and not the first cause; but the effects signified through the sacraments are proper to God; therefore God alone can determine himself to causing the effect of the sacraments that regularly accompany the sacraments; and consequently it is from the divine will alone that the sacraments determinately have their efficacy as from their principal cause. – But that the sacraments have their efficacy from the passion of Christ as from their meritorious cause is thus declared: for obedience is more pleasing and more accepted on his behalf for whom it is offered, and for attaining the end for which the offering is made, the more it is offered by someone who is more loved and

Reply to Objection 2. It can be said that all the sacraments of the New Law have their efficacy from the passion of Christ as presented, not, to be sure, in an exterior act factually represented, but in an interior act. For Christ himself, from the moment of his conception, possessed the merits of the passion insofar as he accepted it and offered it to his Father for the elect; and in that interior act, indeed, principally consists the idea of merit. But, before his conception, that passion was not thus presented and accepted by God, for then it existed precisely in divine foreknowledge but was not presented in any real act of Christ. Nevertheless, because of his seeing it in advance, God never abandoned the human race but provided remedies necessary for salvation. Hence, although he instituted certain sacraments before it was made manifest, these sacraments obtained the same efficacy from the passion of Christ as if they had been instituted after the resurrection of Christ. Or it could be said that the sacraments of the New Law had less efficacy when Christ was alive than after his passion had been shown and represented; and nevertheless they had to be instituted by him when alive because they were instituted not for that time but to the extent that after his death they were to have their principal efficacy.

Reply to Objection 3. I say that the Apostle was not intending anything other than that grace did not have a deserving meritorious cause in the one on whom it was conferred, although it could have a cause in him meritorious by congruity; but the Apostle did not deny, on the contrary he everywhere lays down, a deserving extrinsic meritorious cause, which cause was Christ the son of God. To be sure he repeats, inculcates, piles up nothing more frequently than that we are freed and snatched from the power of the devil and of our sins, and that we are restored to the pristine liberty of sons of God and have been reconciled to him, by the merits of the passion of Christ.

Reply to Objection 4. I concede that the sacraments did not flow from the wound inflicted on the side of Christ when he was already dead, but that they are said to this extent to flow especially from thence insofar as two of the more principal sacraments possess, with respect to the sensibles things in which they are instituted, a certain rather express likeness of the things that flowed from thence; for blood is more especially assimilated to the species under which blood is present in the Eucharist, and water is more especially assimilated to the matter of Baptism. This way of understanding can be had from the chapter *In quadam de celebrat. Miss.*, where it is said that in those two things, namely in water and in blood, the two greatest sacraments of redemption and regeneration shine out.

Article 6. Whether the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace?

Aquinas

Objection 1. It seems that the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace. For, as stated above (5, ad 2) the sacraments of the New

Scotus [Oxon. 4 d.1 qq.3, 6; Report. ib. q.5]

Objection 1. The sacraments of the Old Law do not seem to have caused grace. For

Law derive their efficacy from faith in Christ's Passion. But there was faith in Christ's Passion under the Old Law, as well as under the New, since we have "the same spirit of faith" (2 *Corinthians* 4:13). Therefore just as the sacraments of the New Law confer grace, so did the sacraments of the Old Law.

Objection 2. Further, there is no sanctification save by grace. But men were sanctified by the sacraments of the Old Law: for it is written (*Leviticus* 8:31): "And when he," i.e. Moses, "had sanctified them," i.e. Aaron and his sons, "in their vestments," etc. Therefore it seems that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace.

Objection 3. Further, Bede says in *a homily on the Circumcision*: "Under the Law circumcision provided the same health-giving balm against the wound of original sin, as baptism in the time of revealed grace." But Baptism confers grace now. Therefore circumcision conferred grace; and in like manner, the other sacraments of the Law; for just as Baptism is the door of the sacraments of the New Law, so was circumcision the door of the sacraments of the Old Law: hence the Apostle says (*Galatians* 5:3): "I testify to every man circumcising himself, that he is a debtor to the whole law."

On the contrary, It is written (*Galatians* 4:9): "Turn you again to the weak and needy elements?" i.e. "to the Law," says the gloss, "which is called weak, because it does not justify perfectly." But grace justifies perfectly. Therefore the sacraments of the old Law did not confer grace.

I answer that, It cannot be said that the sacraments of the Old Law conferred sanctifying grace of themselves, i.e. by

[*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.6 n.1] Augustine on the Psalm *Ut quid Deus repulisti in finem* says, speaking of the sacraments of the Old Law, "They were only promising and signifying, but these (that is to say the sacraments of the New Law) give salvation." But to promise and signify grace is not to cause it; therefore the sacraments of the Old Law did not cause grace.

Objection 2. [*Oxon.* 4 d.3 q.4 n.19] If the sacraments of the Old Law conferred grace on those who received them, they would have assuredly had that from the merits of Christ's passion. Therefore the more any of them approached to expressing the passion of Christ, the fuller the grace they would have caused; but it is not conceded that the offerings of the Old Law, which prefigured the offering of Christ, caused grace from the work worked (*ex opere operato*); therefore much less could others have had that effect which represented the passion of Christ less distinctly.

Objection 3. [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.6 n.11] The greatest sacrament of the Old Law seems to have been circumcision through which original sin was destroyed: but grace was not conferred by this on those who were subject to it, as the Master bears witness (*Sentences* 4 d.1 litt. K), saying, "For sins alone were there remitted, but no helper was providing there grace or growth for acting;" therefore no other sacrament conferred grace.

On the contrary, by some sacraments of the Old Law original sin was remitted (from the preceding question, article 3); therefore grace was caused by them in the same way that by Baptism, because original sin is remitted by it, grace is caused.

I answer that, it must be said that the sacraments of the Old Law caused grace

their own power: since thus Christ's Passion would not have been necessary, according to *Gal. 2:21*: "If justice be by the Law, then Christ died in vain."

But neither can it be said that they derived the power of conferring sanctifying grace from Christ's Passion. For as it was stated above (q.51), the power of Christ's Passion is united to us by faith and the sacraments, but in different ways; because the link that comes from faith is produced by an act of the soul; whereas the link that comes from the sacraments, is produced by making use of exterior things. Now nothing hinders that which is subsequent in point of time, from causing movement, even before it exists in reality, in so far as it pre-exists in an act of the soul: thus the end, which is subsequent in point of time, moves the agent in so far as it is apprehended and desired by him. On the other hand, what does not yet actually exist, does not cause movement if we consider the use of exterior things. Consequently, the efficient cause cannot in point of time come into existence after causing movement, as does the final cause. It is therefore clear that the sacraments of the New Law do reasonably derive the power of justification from Christ's Passion, which is the cause of man's righteousness; whereas the sacraments of the Old Law did not.

Nevertheless the Fathers of old were justified by faith in Christ's Passion, just as we are. And the sacraments of the old Law were a kind of protestation of that faith, inasmuch as they signified Christ's Passion and its effects. It is therefore manifest that the sacraments of the Old Law were not endowed with any power by which they conduced to the bestowal of justifying grace: and they merely signified faith by which men were justified.

just as the sacraments of the New Law cause it, that is from the work worked (*ex opere operato*), although not as efficaciously. For this purpose one must understand [Oxon. 4 d.1 q.6 n.10] that a sacrament is in one way distinguished or divided, after the manner that an equivocal term is divided into its several significations, into sacrament properly so called and sacrament improperly so called; and the first of these is what we defined in q.60 a.1. But improperly a sacrament is whatever has been instituted for divine worship but does not have efficacy against original sickness; such, in the law of nature, were genuflections and other such things, and, in the Law of Moses, diverse ceremonies, which can all be called sacraments, that is sacred signs, because instituted for divine worship.

But a sacrament properly so called can be distinguished or divided as above into its inferiors in three ways: first insofar as the inferiors signify one or other sacrament, as the Eucharist, Penance, Baptism, which is the division of a genus into its species: secondly, by reason of their subject matter, as Baptism and Circumcision; for although both of these were instituted against original sin, nevertheless they were instituted in different sensible things, and so they are distinguished by their subject matter: third and last, they can be distinguished in their order to what they signify, as either that they signify one thing more expressly than another or that they confer greater grace, like the sacrament of Baptism with respect to Circumcision.

Declaration of the conclusion: [Oxon. *ib.*] because God at no time left the human race without a necessary remedy for salvation, least of all those to whom he himself gave the law so that through the observance of it they might attain to salvation (for without a

Reply to Objection 1. The Fathers of old had faith in the future Passion of Christ, which, inasmuch as it was apprehended by the mind, was able to justify them. But we have faith in the past Passion of Christ, which is able to justify, also by the real use of sacramental things as stated above.

Reply to Objection 2. That sanctification was but a figure: for they were said to be sanctified inasmuch as they gave themselves up to the Divine worship according to the rite of the Old Law, which was wholly ordained to the foreshadowing of Christ's Passion.

Reply to Objection 3. There have been many opinions about Circumcision. For, according to some, Circumcision conferred no grace, but only remitted sin. But this is impossible; because man is not justified from sin save by grace, according to *Rm.* 3:24: "Being justified freely by His grace."

Wherefore others said that by Circumcision grace is conferred, as to the privative effects of sin, but not as to its positive effects. But this also appears to be false, because by Circumcision, children received the faculty of obtaining glory, which is the ultimate positive effect of grace. Moreover, as regards the order of the formal cause, positive effects are naturally prior to privative effects, though according to the order of the material cause, the reverse is the case: for a form does not exclude privation save by informing the subject.

Hence others say that Circumcision conferred grace also as regards a certain positive effect, i.e. by making man worthy of eternal life, but not so as to repress concupiscence which makes man prone to sin. And so at one time it seemed to me. But if the matter be considered carefully, this too appears to be untrue; because the

remedy by means of which they could be saved such a law would have been given in vain), therefore it must be judged that in the time of the Mosaic law God had prepared a medicine against the sickness of original guilt: but no one could reach salvation without the removal of original sin; therefore a sacrament instituted against original sin ought to cause grace whereby that sin might be destroyed. For there ought to be a certain and efficacious sign, that is, such that, through its application, they were certain from divine compact that grace had been conferred and original sin destroyed: but the sacraments of the New Law, which are said to cause grace, [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.7 n.2] do not have in them more than to be certain and efficacious signs of grace, which through their application is conferred on those who rightly receive them; therefore the sacraments of the Old Law too equally caused grace, although less efficaciously, because the passion of Christ had not yet been presented (as was said in the preceding article).

Reply to Objection 1. I say [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.6 n.13] that Augustine (and any other fathers found to say that the sacraments of the Old Law signified grace only and did not confer it) held that understanding about sacraments improperly so called, of which there were many in the Old Law. Therefore I concede that sacraments of this sort, taken in the broad sense, did not cause grace from the work worked (*ex opere operato*) as efficacious signs of it. And of this sort were those purifications that have to be made according to the law through the water of expiation (as is said in *Leviticus*); and purification from leprosy and several other things of that sort; but also the offerings of victims, which came closer to the perfection of sacraments, because they belonged to the cult of worship for the time for which God wished to have such cult.

very least grace is sufficient to resist any degree of concupiscence, and to merit eternal life.

And therefore it seems better to say that Circumcision was a sign of justifying faith: wherefore the Apostle says (*Romans 4:11*) that Abraham "received the sign of Circumcision, a seal of the justice of faith." Consequently grace was conferred in Circumcision in so far as it was a sign of Christ's future Passion, as will be made clear further on (70, 4).

work worked (*ex opere operato*), but only by way of merit, as was said. But I deny that the same reasoning holds of Circumcision; for since God instituted this so that it might be a sacrament properly speaking in which original guilt was destroyed, that guilt, according to the ordained power of God, could not at all have been destroyed unless Circumcision had conferred grace from the work worked (*ex opere operato*).

Reply to Objection 3. I say [*Oxon.* 4 d.1 q.6 n.11] that the Master there compares Circumcision to Baptism; since, therefore, with respect to Baptism Circumcision conferred a small grace, as was declared in the preceding article, for that reason he denied that it caused grace, that is to say, as much grace as is conferred in the conferring of Baptism. But about Circumcision, see q.70 below.

These, I say, were all called ceremonies and sacraments improperly, and for that reason, as I said, they neither conferred nor caused grace from the work worked (*ex opere operato*); but nevertheless grace was conferred in them by way of merit; for those who observed the precepts of God out of obedience and charity earned merit. In the same way it is certain that those who did not obey those commandments earned demerit and sinned.

Reply to Objection 2. [*Oxon. ib.*, d.3 q.4 n.19] I concede that certain sacraments of the Old Law did not cause grace from the